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1 Introduction
Societies and communities often have to defend from or compete with hostile
out-groups. Cities and villages often su¤ered raids from barbarians, pirates
or bandits. Ordinary citizens need to protect themselves from the appro-
priation e¤orts by criminal networks. States and empires often clash over
the control of natural resources or have to resist the attack of rival nations.
Suppose that these communities, while remaining in confrontation with an
out-group, have solved any possible conict of interests within themselves.
They accept the current distribution of income or hold binding agreements
on how to share the value of the object they are ghting for against the out-
group. We then ask the following question: Are more egalitarian societies
more or less likely to prevail in such confrontations?
Apart from its intrinsic interest, this question is important because the
interplay between chances of success and within-group inequality opens the
door to income redistribution. If, for instance, a more egalitarian distri-
bution of income within the community enhances its prospects of victory,
members of that society may voluntarily transfer part of their income to
poorer members. In short, the presence of external conicts may provide a
rationale for the redistribution of income we observe in societies.
In this paper we show that the answers to these two questions, whether
egalitarianism enhances the chances of victory of society and whether a so-
ciety may want to engage in income redistribution as a result, depend on the
technologies of conict. If the e¤orts of the members are substitutes, more
inequality is better because inequality increases the incentives to contribute
of richer members, who are the ones who have most to gain from victory.
If, on the contrary, e¤orts are complements, more egalitarian societies fare
better in the confrontation. This is because all members must contribute
for society to be successful in the conict, implying that members with the
lowest incentives to contribute are key. These members are the poorer mem-
bers since they are the ones with the lowest stake in the ght. So the richer
they are, that is, the more egalitarian is the distribution of income within
that society, the more they contribute to defeat the out-group. The cost of
conict contributions plays also a crucial role. If the marginal cost of e¤orts
increases rapidly, this will deter richer members from contributing substan-
tially. In that case, more egalitarianism makes the group more e¤ective in
the confrontation.
Conict thus generates two types of redistribution. First, conict shapes
the income distribution within society because its members contribute to the
success of the group. The resulting distribution of income could be more or
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less egalitarian than the initial one. We show that as e¤orts become more
complementary the distribution of contributions becomes more egalitarian
so conict is in e¤ect implementing a regressive tax scheme. As a result, the
nal distribution of income is more unequal than the initial one. We say then
that conict is pro-rich. The opposite holds when e¤orts are substitutes.
Conict is pro-poor because richer members contribute a bigger share of
their income than poorer members. Second, members of the community may
be willing to engage in income redistribution as a result of the presence of
the hostile out-group. The incentives to redistribute vary in their direction,
from the rich to the poor or viceversa, depending on the technologies of
conict. When e¤orts are complementary enough or their cost is convex
enough we show that richer members are willing to transfer voluntarily part
of their income to poorer members. The opposite holds when e¤orts are
substitutes or the cost is linear enough. This is because even though success
of the group increases with inequality in that case, poorer members have less
to gain from victory. They have little incentives to transfer their income to
richer members in order to induce them to ght harder.
The relationship between egalitarianism and collective action has been
subject to analysis for long now. Olson (1965) argued informally that more
inequality favors collective action, public good provision for instance, since
it maximizes the incentives of richer members to engage in it. Hirshleifer
(1983) argued that this result rests critically on the assumption that the
amount of public good provided depends on the sum of contributions. When
contributions are perfect complements, i.e., the weakest-link technology of
provision, inequality hinders public good porvision. Using examples, Cornes
(1993) and Cornes and Sandler (1996) corroborated that Olsons intuition
does not hold in general. In the closest contribution to ours, Ray et al.
(2007) characterize the relationship between the surplus generated by a joint
project, inequality in the shares of the resulting output and the technology
of production. These authors show, as we do, that egalitarianism can be
welfare enhancing if contributions are complementary enough. We focus on
the specic case of conict against an out-group and consider the incentives
to redistribute income that communities may have as a result. In the context
of public goods, Vicary (1990) and Cornes (1993) explored this issue but only
for the weakest-link technology. Both show that under this technology the
"distribution neutrality" result by Bergstrom et al. (1986) no longer holds.
In the literature on conict, to the best of our knowledge, only Este-
ban and Ray´s (2011) model of ethnic conict has analyzed the role of
within-group inequality. These authors model a situation where members
can contribute with their time or use money to increase the activism of
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other members. Money and time are thus substitutes. They show that
more within-group inequality makes groups more violent because the op-
portunity cost of time for poorer member decreases, so richer members nd
it easier to buy higher levels of activism from them. Our model also belongs
to the literature that has explored the role of conict in producing income
redistribution. Hirshleifer (1991) pointed out that income redistribution is
one of societys responses to the threat of internal conict. Individuals or
social groups resort to conict if by doing so they can improve their posi-
tion relative to the current distribution of income. Within-society income
redistribution thus becomes a way of avoiding internal conict. Bevia and
Corchon (2010) argued that a similar mechanism can help societies to avoid
conict against external agents. If a rich society transfers some of its income
to an external group, that out-group becomes less interested in initiating a
costly confrontation. In our case, we study how redistribution within a so-
ciety can help to improve the societys chances of victory in an external
confrontation.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section we
present the basic elements of the model. In Section 3, we characterize its
equilibrium and perform comparative statics. Section 4 explores the implicit
redistribution that conict generates and the incentives of members of the
group to engage in income transfers. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Conict
Let us consider a group formed n > 1 members who di¤er in income. A
member i owns a share i > 0 of the total income of the group (net of sub-
sistence level) denoted by Y such that
Pn
i=1 i = 1: Let us index members
increasingly by income so i  i+1 for i = 1; :::; n  1:
This group is subject to the threat of an external entity that we model
as a unitary agent. We will simply refer to it as the threat. Both the group
and the threat are in confrontation. If the group prevails its members are
able to retain their individual income yi = iY . If the threat wins the
conict, it appropriates the entire income of the group and its members get
nothing: Alternatively we could interpret the setting as a situation where
the group and the threat are competing for a prize of value Y (a territory, a
monopoly rent, a natural resource) so the vector  = (1; :::; n) represents
a binding agreement among group members on how to divide that prize in
case of victory.
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Both the group and the Threat can invest resources in order to prevail in
this confrontation. The outcome of the conict depends on the e¤orts spent
by each of the two sides. Denote by x = (x1; :::; xn) the vector of conict
e¤orts made by the members of the group and denote by xo the e¤ort made
by the threat. We assume that the groups winning probability is
p(x) =
h(x;n)
xo + h(x;n)
; (1)
where the function
h(x;n) = n[
nX
i=1
1
n
xi
1 ]
1
1  ; (2)
is called the impact function of the group. The parameter   0 represents
the degree of complementarity between memberse¤orts. In the context of
public good provision, similar functions have been used by Cornes (1993) and
Ray et al. (2007). On the other hand, the group Contest Success Function
(CSF) in (1) has been axiomatized by Münster (2009). It encompasses
as particular cases the Tullock CSF (Tullock, 1967) when  = 0 and the
weakest-link technology (Hirshleifer, 1983) when  !1:
In particular, note that impact function (2) satises two important prop-
erties:
 Constant returns to scale: For all k > 0, h(kx; n) = kh(x; n):
 No group-size bias (Kolmar and Rommeswinkel, 2011): For any
natural number k, it holds that h(xk ; kn) = h(x;n):
Constant returns to scale is an appealing property in this context because
it implies that the relative success of a contender does not depend on the
unit of measurement of e¤ort. Note that this property also implies that
the CSF in (1) is homogeneous of degree zero (Münster, 2009). On the
other hand, the No group-size bias property implies that the impact of two
groups who have exerted the same total e¤ort should be the same regardless
of their size. Many CSFs implicitly build in some group-size bias because
this property is closely related to the degree of complementarity of e¤orts.
Consider for instance the seemingly more natural impact function.
g(x;n) = [
nX
i=1
xi
1 ]
1
1  :
It is straightforward to show that this impact function presents positive
group-size bias, i.e. h(xk ; kn) > h(x;n); if and only if  < 1; and a negative
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group-size bias, i.e. h(xk ; kn) < h(x;n); if and only if  > 1: By assuming
away any group-size bias, we avoid any confounding e¤ect from group size
on our result and focus only on the e¤ect of internal inequality.
We assume that the cost of e¤ort is iso-elastic and of the form
c(xi) =
1
1 + 
x1+i ;
where   0. Similarly for the threat. This functional form was rst con-
sidered by Esteban and Ray (1999) and its properties studied in relation to
the group-size paradox in Esteban and Ray (2001).
The payo¤ function for a group member boils down to
ui = pyi   c(xi) = h(x;n)
xo + h(x;n)
iY   1
1 + 
x1+i ; (3)
whereas for the threat it is just
uo = (1  p)Y   c(xo) = xo
xo + h(x;n)
Y   1
1 + 
x1+o : (4)
2.2 Inequality
Consider that the income distribution in a society is given by the vector
y = (y1; :::; yn): The measure of income inequality we will consider here was
proposed by Atkinson (1970) and it is dened as
A"(y) = 1  y"
y
;
where y is societys average income and y" is the Equally Distributed Equiv-
alent Income (EDEI) which is given by
y" = [
1
n
nX
i=1
y1 "i ]
1
1 " = Y  [ 1
n
nX
i=1
i
1 "]
1
1 " : (5)
The parameter " measures societys attitude towards inequality. In our
set up, the Atkinson index boils down to
A"(y) =
8<: 1  n[
1
n
Pn
i=1 i
1 "]
1
1 " for " 6= 1
1  n
nQ
i=1

1
n
i for " = 1
: (6)
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The parameter " embeds a normative judgment over income inequality.1
Observe that A"(0) = 0 and that lim
"!1A"(y) = 1   n1; so the inequality
index depends only on the income of the worst-o¤ member in the group. In
the original formulation of the Atkinson index, it is always assumed that
"  0 so incomes are socially evaluated according to a concave function,
implying y" < y: Under that assumption, the index is consistent with the
following principle:
 Principle of transfers (Pigou-Dalton principle): Take two vec-
tors y and y0, where y0 is obtained by adding  > 0 to yi and sub-
stracting it from yj for j > i and such that yj    > yi + : Then
A"(y) > A"(y
0).
This principle states that when "  0 a rank-preserving income transfer
from a richer individual to a poorer individual cannot increase inequality.
However, the functional form of the Atkinson index does not preclude that
society may have a preference for inequality, i.e. " < 0: The literature
on inequality measurement never considers this case since this literature
implicitly assumes that inequality is not socially desirable. When " < 0
it turns out that ye > y; and the index becomes non-positive, with higher
absolute values corresponding to higher levels of inequality. Observe for
instance that lim
"! 1A"(y) = 1   nn; so the index is negative unless the
distribution of income is perfectly equal, i.e. i = 1n for all members. In
this case thus, the index satises the Reversed principle of transfers, that is,
given two distributions y and y0 dened as above A"(y) < A"(y0).
It is easy to show that for any value of "; either positive or negative,
the Atkinson index satises two particularly relevant properties (Lambert,
2001).
 Scale invariance: For all k > 0; A"(ky) = A"(y):
 Principle of population: For any natural number k denote by yk
the vector containing k times each and all of the elements in y: Then
A"(y
k) = A"(y):
1Atkinson (1970) proposes an equivalence between inequality aversion and risk aversion
based on the idea that behind the veil of ignorance more risk-averse individuals would
prefer more egalitarian distributions of income. Under that interpretation, the EDEI is
the level of income that if equally distributed would give individuals a level of equality
equal to the expected utility they would enjoy under the original distribution behind the
veil of ignorance .
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Scale invariance, i.e. homogeneity of degree zero, is an appealing prop-
erty because it implies that inequality does not depend on the unit of mea-
surement of income. On the other hand, the Principle of population im-
plies that the Atkinson index remains invariant under replications of the
population (and its incomes). These properties will be helpful later when
characterizing the equilibrium of the conict game.
3 The equilibrium
3.1 Existence
Let us now characterize the equilibrium of this game. To do so we exploit
the properties of the Atkinson index we have just outlined.
A member i of the group seeks to maximize (3) taking as given the e¤ort
of other members and the e¤ort made by the threat. Her optimal decision
is characterized by the following expression
@ui
@xi
=
p(1  p)
h(x;n)
@h(x;n)
@xi
iY   xi = 0 i = 1; :::; n: (7)
From this it is possible to write the relation between the optimal e¤orts
of any two members
xi
xj
= (
i
j
)
1
+ : (8)
This expression give us a rst indication of how the impact function and
the cost function a¤ect the distribution of e¤orts across members. Members
e¤orts become more similar the more complementary e¤orts are and the
more convex their cost, i.e. the higher  + . Actually, expression (7)
implies that whenever +  > 0 it cannot be a best response for a member
to exert no e¤ort if another member is exerting a positive e¤ort. Hence, in
any equilibrium, either all members or no member are contributing. There
are, however, two exceptions to this result.
Case 1: Tullock contest (Tullock, 1967) Consider the case where mem-
berse¤orts are perfect substitutes and the cost is linear, i.e. + = 0:
In that case, observe that the rst order condition (7) becomes
@ui
@xi
=
p(1  p)Pn
i=1 xi
iY   1 i = 1; :::; n;
implying that only the member with the highest income, that is, mem-
ber n; exerts positive e¤ort. This is a well-known result in the litera-
ture on contests (Baik, 1993).
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Case 2: Weakest-link technology (Hirshleifer, 1983) When the im-
pact function displays perfect complementarity between membersef-
forts, i.e.  !1; it boils down to
h(x;n) = n minfx1; :::; xng:
In that case, it is clear that in any equilibrium all members will exert
the same level of e¤ort. Dene x1 as the e¤ort choice of the poorest
member that satises
@ui
@xi
=
xo
(nx1 + xo)2
1Y   1 = 0;
that is, x1 is member 1 optimal choice under the assumption that
all other members also exert x1: Then, it is quite straightforward to
see that there exists a continuum of equilibria in which all members
contribute the same amount of e¤ort, ranging from 0 to x1: Members
of the group face thus a coordination problem.
For the sake of exposition we assume that +  > 0 and focus on fully
interior equilibria.
On the other hand, the optimal e¤ort choice for the threat is given by
the following FOC
@ui
@xo
=
p(1  p)
xo
Y   xo = 0: (9)
Combining (7) and (9) it is possible to express the relationship between
the optimal e¤ort decisions of the group members and the threat in a com-
pact way
c(xi)
c(xo)
= (
xi
xo
)1+ =
ixi
h(x;n)
@h(x;n)
@xi
=
i
1+
+Pn
j=1 j
1 
+
(10)
We are nally in the position to state our rst result
Proposition 1 When +  > 0, there exists a unique interior equilibrium
e¤ort prole characterized by
x1+o = p(1  p)Y;
x1+i = p(1  p)tiyi i = 1; :::; n;
where
ti =
i
1 
+Pn
j=1 j
1 
+
(11)
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Proof. First, we need to show that (7)-(9) characterize local maxima of the
maximization problem faced by member i and the external threat respec-
tively. For the threat, the SOC is satised if
@2ui
@2xo
=  2p(1  p)
2
x2o
Y   x 1o < 0;
which is always the case. For the problem of a member i; the SOC is satised
if
@2ui
@2xi
=
p(1  p)
h(x;n)
iY [
@2h(x;n)
@2xi
  2
H
(
@h(x;n)
@xi
)2] x 1i < 0 i = 1; :::; n;
(12)
where in order to ease notation H = h(x;n)+xo: Simple calculus shows that
@2h(x;n)
@2xi
= x  1i (
h(x;n)
n
)[
x1 iPn
i=1 xi
1    1]  0:
which implies that (7) holds strictly whenever  +  > 0 and there is at
most one value of xi that solves this equation for any given x i and xo.
This Proposition demonstrates: memberse¤ort contributions are non-
decreasing in their income, i.e. tiyi > tjyj for all i > j: Richer members
have a higher marginal benet from contributing to the success of the group
and hence exert more e¤ort. On the other hand, observe that members
contribute a share ti of their income. The presence of an external conict
is thus taxing members implicitly. This implicit tax ti is not raised by any
authority. It is paid voluntarily by members in order to defend their incomes.
This tax rate does not necessarily increase with the income of the member,
so it is possible that poorer members make lower contributions but they
contribute a higher share of their income. Below we exploit this result and
analyze whether the implicit redistribution that conict generates is pro-rich
or pro-poor.
From here, and using simple algebra, it is possible to state one of our
main results.
Proposition 2 The groups equilibrium winning probability is
p =
[1 Ab"(y)] 11+
n
1 
1+ + [1 Ab"(y)] 11+ ; (13)
where b" = 1  1 + :
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Proof. Combining the expressions (8) and (10), it is possible to write the
equilibrium winning probability of the group as
p =
[[
Pn
j=1 
1 
+
j ]
+
1  ]
1
1+
n

1  + [[
Pn
j=1 j
1 
+ ]
+
1  ]
1
1+
On the other hand, note that given (6) and a level of inequality aversion
" it is possible to write the EDEI as
[
nX
i=1
i
1 "]
1
1 " = n
"
1 " [1 A"(y)]: (14)
Now, dene b" = 1  1 + : Given that, it is straightforward to rewrite the
equilibrium winning probability as stated in the text of the Proposition.
The Proposition shows that it is possible to write relevant equilibrium
variables as a function of the Atkinson index of inequality of the distribution
of income within the group. For that, the inequality aversion parameter
must be set as b". This parameter b" is increasing both in the degree of
complementarity of e¤orts  and the cost elasticity of e¤ort  and ranges
between  1 and 2. Once we know the functional relationship between
inequality and success in the conict we can perform comparative statics on
the equilibrium.
3.2 Comparative statics
Let us rst analyze the question of how the level of inequality within the
group a¤ects its chances of prevailing over the external threat. To do so we
use income transfers as a natural way of comparing distributions in terms
of their inequality. We say that a transfer is progressive (regressive) when it
is made from an individual i to an individual j such that i > (<)j and such
that the relative ranking of these two individuals remains unchanged after
the transfer.
Proposition 3 Given two distributions of income y and y0 such that y0
can be obtained after a sequence of progressive transfers, the groups winning
probability p is lower under y than and y0 if and only if b"  0.
The proof of this result is immediate from inspection of (13) and after
using the fact that the Atkinson index of inequality is consistent with the
Principle of transfers if and only if b"  0.
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This proposition shows that when members e¤orts are substitutable
enough or the cost of e¤ort is linear enough, more unequal communities
tend to fare better in conict. On the other hand, when e¤orts are com-
plementary enough and the cost of e¤ort is convex enough, i.e. b"  0;
more egalitarian societies have a higher chance of prevailing over the exter-
nal threat. The intuition for this result is easy to grasp: Complementarity
of e¤orts discourages free-riding. All members must contribute if the group
wants to have a fair chance of defeating threat. Poorer members are the ones
who have less to gain from victory. Hence, the higher their income share,
that is, the more egalitarian the group, the more they contribute. When
e¤orts are substitutes, poorer members can free-ride in richer members who
have more at stake in the conict. So the higher the income share of the
richer members the higher their e¤orts.
Regarding the cost, the more convex it becomes the less willing mem-
bers are to contribute a substantial amount of e¤ort. This deterrent e¤ect
is especially strong for richer members who shy away from making high con-
tributions. More egalitarianism weakens this e¤ect and helps the success of
the group.
The properties of the Atkinson index allow us to perform some additional
comparative statics
Proposition 4 The groups equilibrium winning probability p decreases
(i) When members of the group are replicated if and only if  < 1;
(ii) With the degree of complementarity of memberse¤orts :
Proof. For part (i) we use the Principle of Population of the Atkinson
index. If the population is replicated the index remains invariant. We thus
only need to check the term n
1 
1+ in the denominator of (13). It is clear that
this term is increasing in n (and hence p is decreasing in n) if and only if
 < 1:
For part (ii) note that the parameter  only appears in Ab"(y): Recall
that p is decreasing in Ab"(y): Given that for a given income distribution;
the index is increasing in the inequality aversion parameter b" and that b" is
increasing in ; the winning probability p decreases as  increases.
Esteban and Ray (2001) obtain that when the cost of conict e¤ort is
convex enough, bigger groups are more e¤ective in conict, and the so-called
"group size paradox" (Olson, 1965) is reversed. In our set up, increasing
the size of the group is not a straightforward comparative statics exercise
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because the income distribution within the group changes as well. We are
able to obtain an analogous result by employing the Principle of population
and the Atkinson index: If the population is replicated, and so their income,
the Atkinson index does not change, so any change in the winning probability
is due to the direct change in n.
Part (ii) of the Proposition shows that when e¤orts are substitutes, that
is,  is relatively low, poorer members can free-ride on the e¤orts of richer
members who have more at stake in the conict. When e¤orts become more
complements however, all members need to contribute in order to ensure that
the group has a chance of prevailing against the threat. This incentivizes
poorer members to contribute more. But these are precisely the members
who have less to gain from winning the conict. Complementarity thus
reduces the e¤ectiveness of the contributions by richer members because, as
we can see from expression (8), it equalizes contributions across members.
The success of the group thus rests on poorer members, whose e¤ort is less
intense than for richer members, making the group less e¤ective.
Example 1: Tullock Contests Success Function: The Tullock CSF
assumes that members e¤orts are perfect substitutes, i.e.  = 0. Two
specications have been mostly studied. The one with linear costs, i.e.
 = 0 (Tullock, 1967; Baik, 1993) and the one with quadratic costs, i.e.
 = 1 (Esteban and Ray, 1999).
The Tullock contest with linear costs corresponds to the case b"!  1:
In this case only the member with the highest valuation of victory would
exert positive e¤ort, member n in our case.
The groups equilibrium winning probability then boils down to
p =
n
1 + n
;
so the income of agent n is the sole determinant of the success of the group.
Note that in this case 1) the distribution of conict e¤orts is rather unequal,
i.e. ti = 0 for all i < n; and 2) that poorer individuals might be potentially
interested in transferring income to the richest individual in order to fuel
her conict e¤ort.
The Tullock contest with quadratic costs corresponds to the case whereb" = 0: In this case the Atkinson index of inequality is equal to zero for any
distribution of income and the groups winning probability becomes just
p = 1=2: Hence, the success of the group does not depend on how income
is distributed within the group.
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Example 2: The weakest-link technology (Hirshleifer, 1983). When
memberse¤orts are perfect complements, i.e.  ! 1; only the minimum
e¤ort determines the success of the group. Hence
h(x;n) = n minfx1; :::; xng:
This case corresponds to b"! 2: In this case, all members exert the same
level of e¤ort in equilibrium. As we mentioned above, there exists a con-
tinuum of these equilibria . We will select the Pareto superior equilibrium,
the one in which all members contribute x1: This would also be the selected
equilibrium if one of the members were to move before the rest. The groups
equilibrium winning probability in that case boils down to
p =
n1
1
1+
1 + n1
1
1+
;
so the success of the group only depends on the share of income held by the
worst-o¤ member. This implies that 1) the distribution of conict e¤orts is
perfectly egalitarian; and 2) that richer individuals might be interested in
transferring income to the worst-o¤ member in order to boost her conict
e¤ort.
4 Redistribution
4.1 Redistribution through conict
In this section we study the relationship between income redistribution and
conict. We analyze two issues. First, how the presence of an external threat
shapes the distribution of income within the group. Second, we explore the
incentives of the group to engage in pre-conict income redistribution.
As we saw in the previous section, starting from a peaceful situation
where agents enjoy a share of the total income i the emergence of an
external threat alters the distribution of that income. Members contribute in
equilibrium a share p(1 p)ti of their income in order to defend their group
and their incomes. The resulting distribution may be more or less egalitarian
than the initial one. We next analyze whether this implicit taxation that
conict induces is pro-rich or pro-poor.
At this point it is necessary to dene the Lorenz curve for the relevant
distributions. The Lorenz curve of the initial income distribution L is just
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given by the income shares
Lj =
jX
i=1
i j = 1; :::; n:
Similarly, the Lorenz curve for the cost distribution Lc is given by the
shares
Lcj =
jX
i=1
xi
1+Pn
i=1 xi
1+
=
jX
i=1
2 b"iPn
i=1 i
2 b" j = 1; :::; n:
Finally, the Lorenz curve for the ex post income in case of victory Lbu is
given by shares
Lbuj =
jX
i=1
yi(1  ti)Pn
i=1 yi(1  ti)
j = 1; :::; n:
By the Jakobson-Fellman Theorem (1976) it is possible to show that
Lbu  L  Lc , ti  tj for any i > j:
This theorem together with inspection of expression (11) for ti yield the
following corollary.
Corollary 5 The ex ante distribution of income Lorenz-dominates the ex
post distribution of income if and only if b"  1
When e¤orts are complementary enough, the implicit redistribution caused
by conict is pro-rich. That is, the ex post income distribution is more un-
equal than the original distribution. This is because, when e¤orts are com-
plementary, poorer members must contribute in order to secure a chance of
success in the conict. Therefore the prole of contributions is regressive.
When e¤orts are substitutes, though, poorer members can free ride on the
e¤ort of richer members and the resulting prole of contributions is progres-
sive: richer members contribute a higher share of their income that poorer
members.
4.2 The e¤ect of income redistribution
Let us now analyze the question of whether members of the group have incen-
tives to engage in pre-conict redistribution in order to improve its chances
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of prevailing over the threat. To this end we can exploit the properties of
the Atkinson index.
Recall that the group winning probability p is decreasing in the Atkin-
son index of inequality. Because the properties of the index depend on the
value of b", transfers have di¤erent e¤ects under di¤erent technologies.
Proposition 6 The groups equilibrium winning probability p increases
(i) With a progressive transfer if b"  0; The increase is larger the poorer
the two members involved in the transfer.
(ii) With a regressive transfer if b" < 0: When b" 2 ( 1; 0) this increase
is larger the poorer the two members involved in the transfer. The
opposite holds when b"   1:
Proof. The proof of this Proposition rests on the properties of the Atkinson
index. When "  0;the index satises the Principle of transfers. In addition,
the fact that w000(yi)  0 implies that a given transfer between poorer agents
is more e¤ective in decreasing inequality than the same transfer made be-
tween richer individuals. This is called the Principle of diminishing transfers
(Kolm, 1976).
Things are slightly less straightforward when b" < 0: In that case, w000(yi) 
0 if and only if b"   1: Recall that in that case, the Atkinson index decreases
only with regressive transfers. A non positive third derivative w000(yi) im-
plies here that such transfer is more e¤ective in reducing the index when is
made between two poorer individuals. To see this consider two individuals
i and j such that yi = yj + and an innitesimal transfer d made from the
latter to the former. The net increase in individuals utilities is just
w = [w0(yi)  w0(yj)]d = [w0(yj +)  w0(yj)]d:
For the impact on the index to be greater when the transfer is made
between poorer it must be that w is decreasing yj ; which requires
w00(yj +) < w00(yj);
and thus that w000(yi) < 0: Finally, when the third derivative is non-negative
the opposite property holds and transfers have a greater impact on the index
if made between richer members.
The Proposition suggests that members may be interested in redistrib-
uting income voluntarily before the conict takes place in order to increase
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their prospects of victory. When b" > 0; the groups winning probability
increases with progressive transfers so richer members may be interested in
transferring some of their income to poorer members in order to incentivise
them to exert more e¤ort. The opposite might happen when b" < 0 since in
that case impact and cost technologies tend to depress poor agentse¤ort.
They might be interested in transferring some income to richer and more
active individuals within the group.
The following proposition characterizes whether these types of voluntary
transfers will take place or not. We have to restrict ourselves to particular
(but relevant) cases since the analysis of general cases is not analytically
tractable.
Proposition 7 In a Tullock contest with both linear or quadratic costs, i.e.b" !  1 or b" = 0; no voluntary transfers take place. Under the weakest-
link technology, i.e. b" = 2; there exists a income threshold  such that
any member with income share i >  is willing to make a transfer to the
worst-o¤ member of the group:
Proof. Let us start with the cases in which voluntary transfers do not take
place. When b"!  1 the payo¤ of any member i 6= n is
ui =
n
1 + n
iY i = 1; :::; n  1:
From here it is straightforward to check that no member has an incentive
to transfer a share of its income to member n:
Similarly for b" = 0; the expected payo¤ of any member is
ui =
1
2
yi(1  i
2(1 + )
);
which does not depend in the income shares of other members and is always
increasing in i: Hence no member has any incentive to transfer part of its
income to another member.
Finally, consider the case where b" = 2: The expected payo¤ for any
member i 6= 1 is just
ui =
n1
1
1+
1 + n1
1
1+
Y (i   1
1 + 
1
1 + n1
1
1+
) i = 2; :::; n:
Knowing that i = 1 1 
P
j 6=1;i j then the impact of an innitesimal
transfer of income from i to member 1 on is payo¤ is given by the derivative
@ui
@1
=
p(1  p)
1 + 
Y
1
(i   1  p

1 + 
1)  pY (1 + 1  p

1 + 
(1  p

1 + 
)):
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And this derivative is positive if and only if
i >   1(1 + 1 + 
1  p +
1  2p
1 + 
):
This Proposition shows that the incentives to redistribute income that
an external confrontation creates have di¤erent strengths depending on the
conict and cost technologies. When b" < 0; a poorer member can increase
the chance of victory of the group by transferring some of her income to a
richer member, but her incentive to do so is rather small because she has a
small stake in the confrontation. When b" > 0 progressive transfers increase
the group winning probability, and richer members can nd protable to give
away part of their income in order to enhance the conict e¤ort of poorer
members. For the case b" ! 1; su¢ ciently rich members are willing to
transfer part of their income to poorest member in order to fuel her conict
e¤ort. Note that such transfers are Pareto improving since all members
benet from them. Note also that as these transfers are made, the identity
of the worst-o¤ member changes and that changes the threshold  as well.
5 Conclusion
The relation between inequality and social conict has been subject to in-
tense theoretical and empirical scrutiny in the last few years. Less attention
however has been given to the relationship between external conict and
internal inequality. In this paper we have shown that the technology of
conict -protection or appropriation- plays a crucial role in that relation.
Egalitarian societies are more likely to prevail in a confrontation against
an external group if the e¤ort of their members are complementary. This
technology encompasses cases such as military secrecy, defence of fortica-
tions or modern armies where strength is very related to the lowest e¤ort
made by members of society. Given that technology, egalitarianism increases
the chances of the group prevailing in the conict because it increases the
stakes of the poorer members. On the other hand, unequal societies are more
e¤ective in conict when e¤orts of their members are substitutes. This sce-
nario encompasses cases such as lobbying or the use of small mercenary
armies. In this case, the community is more successful as richer members
get richer because they have bigger stakes in the conict.
We characterize the relationship between within-group inequality and
conict expenditures as a function of the Atkinson index of inequality. This
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allows us to express equilibrium variables as a relationship of inequality in
a transparent manner and allows us to exploit the properties of the index
when performing comparative statics. For a given distribution of income,
more complementarity of e¤orts is bad for the community. Victory depends
increasingly in the lowest e¤ort, which is made by the poorest members of
the group, which in turn are the ones with the smallest stakes in the conict.
Hence, more complementarity makes the success of the group rest on those
individuals who have the lowest incentives to contribute. On the other hand,
society can obtain an advantage in conict as it becomes bigger provided
that the cost of conict is convex enough. This is in line with previous
results (Esteban and Ray, 2001) showing that convexity of the cost is key
for groups to overcome the collective action problem pointed out by Olson
(1965).
More importantly, we show that members of society have incentives to
engage in voluntary redistribution. This redistribution is aimed at increas-
ing the incentives of other members to contribute more to the conict e¤ort.
This incentives are asymmetric, however. We show that when more egalitar-
ianism within the community makes it more likely to prevail, richer agents
have incentives to transfer part of their income to poorer members. These
transfers can be Pareto improving for the group. However, when more in-
equality makes the group more likely to prevail, poorer members do not
have incentives to make transfers to richer members. This is because poorer
members do not have much to gain from victory. Hence, we conclude that
external threat constitutes a force that explains the progressive income re-
distribution that we observe in modern societies.
There are two limitations in our analysis that deserve further explo-
ration. One is the assumption that the external threat is unitary. In that
sense, conict e¤orts could also be interpreted as e¤orts aimed at mitigat-
ing the e¤ects of a natural catastrophe or at avoiding an epidemic. It would
be interesting to explore the role of relative inequality between the threat
and the group in the equilibrium. The incentives of a society to engage in
income redistribution should also vary depending on the inequality of the
out-group it is facing. The second limitation has to do with the completely
decentralized nature of interactions within the group. Members contribute
e¤orts voluntarily and, if willing to, transfer part of their income to other
members. In reality, states have traditionally requested these e¤orts from its
subjects, often using coercion. Taxation has arisen as an institutional mech-
anism aimed at redistributing income in order to help societies to wage war.
We intend to explore more centralized mechanisms in our future research.
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